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WILDERNESS SOCIETY V. KANE COUNTY, UTAH: A WELCOME
CHANGE FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT AND ENVIRONMENTAL
GROUPS
INTRODUCTION
In an August 2009 decision siding with two environmental groups,
the Tenth Circuit confronted the contentious issue of Revised Statute
2477 ("R.S. 2477"). The statute, which consisted of a single clause in
the Lode Mining Act of 1866, granted "right of way for the construction
of highways over public lands, not reserved for public uses."2 The Fed-
eral Land Policy Management Act ("FLPMA") repealed R.S. 2477 in
1976, but R.S. 2477 rights-of-way perfected prior to FLPMA's enact-
ment remain "valid existing rights."3
Conflicts over R.S. 2477 typically arise between local governments,
which assert legal title to public rights-of-way, and the federal govern-
ment, which manages the federal lands on which the roads are situated.
The most contentious of these conflicts involve local efforts to open new
public routes-or expand existing routes-in sensitive or protected areas.
Such was the case when Kane County officials removed thirty federal
signs which prohibited off-road vehicle use on certain Bureau of Land
Management ("BLM") lands in Utah, replacing them with 268 signs that
purported to open sixty-three new routes to public off-road vehicle use.
In support of its actions, Kane County subsequently enacted Ordinance
2005-03 which purported to give authority to the County to open roads to
off-road vehicles and to "post signs" opening these routes which were
otherwise closed under federal land management plans.4
Two environmental groups 5 challenged the County's actions in fed-
eral court, setting the stage for the Tenth Circuit to revisit the decades-
old R.S. 2477 debate. Underlying the specific conflict between Kane
County and the environmental groups is the growing tension between
conflicting uses of federal lands at the local level. Generally, advocates
of local control favor motorized access and expansion of public uses
while proponents of federal management prefer limited use that favors
environmental preservation over further development. The Tenth Cir-
cuit's 2-1 decision in favor of the environmental groups marked a shift
1. Wilderness Soc'y v. Kane County, Utah, 581 F.3d 1198 (10th Cir. 2009).
2. An Act Granting the Right of Way to Ditch and Canal Owners over the Public Lands, and
for Other Purposes, ch. 262, § 8, 14 Stat. 251, 253 (1866) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 932 (repealed
1976)).
3. Id. § 701 (h), 90 Stat. at 2786.
4. Wilderness Soc'y, 581 F.3d at 1207.
5. The Wilderness Society and the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance.
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in the Tenth Circuit's position to one that favors federal and environ-
mental interests over those of state and local governments.6 In February
2010, the Tenth Circuit decided to revisit the issue by granting en banc
review of the decision.
Part I of this Comment provides a brief history of R.S. 2477 and de-
scribes the current state of R.S. 2477 law. Part II discusses the compli-
cated questions that underlie R.S. 2477 determinations. Part III explores
the attempts by each of the three branches of government to resolve the
R.S. 2477 conflict, in addition to an explanation of the Tenth Circuit's
most recent commentary on R.S. 2477 in Wilderness Society. Finally,
Part IV analyzes the potential impact of Wilderness Society on the future
of R.S. 2477 conflicts and provides an appeal for a permanent, legislative
solution to this seemingly intractable problem.
I. THE COMPLICATED FRAMEWORK OF R.S. 2477
One of the greatest federal lands controversies in the Western Unit-
ed States today is the debate over roads created pursuant to R.S. 2477. 7
Consisting of a single clause in the Lode Mining Act of 1866, R.S. 2477
simply states: "[T]he right of way for the construction of highways over
public lands, not reserved for public uses, is hereby granted. 8 The stat-
ute "was passed during a period in our history when the federal govern-
ment was aggressively promoting settlement of the West."9 R.S. 2477
effectively vested American pioneers with the license to construct roads
across unreserved public lands in support of economic development and
progress. 10
In 1976, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act repealed
R.S. 2477." This repeal was subject to valid existing rights; thus, exist-
ing roads became "grandfathered" property rights. 2 From 1976 forward,
however, the repeal prevented establishment of new rights of way. Even
6. See Wilderness Soc'y, 581 F.3d at 1219-26.
7. DAVID G. HAVLICK, No PLACE DISTANT: ROADS AND MOTORIZED RECREATION ON
AMERICA'S PUBLIC LANDS 71 (2002).
8. An Act Granting the Right of Way to Ditch and Canal Owners over the Public Lands, and
for Other Purposes, ch. 262, § 8, 14 Stat. 251, 253 (1866) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 932 (repealed
1976)).
9. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON R.S. 2477: THE HISTORY AND
MANAGEMENT OF R.S. 2477 RIGHTS-OF-WAY CLAIMS ON FEDERAL AND OTHER LANDS 1 (1993)
[hereinafter R.S. 2477 REPORT].
10. See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 425 F.3d 735, 741 (10th Cir.
2005) ("If someone wished to traverse unappropriated public land, he could do so, with or without
an R.S. 2477 fight of way, and given the federal government's pre-1976 policy of opening and
developing the public lands, federal land managers generally had no reason to question use of the
land for travel. Roads were deemed a good thing.").
II. "Effective on and after the date of approval of this Act, R.S. 2477 (43 U.S.C. 932) is
repealed in its entirety and the following statutes or parts of statutes are repealed insofar as they
apply to the issuance of fights-of-way over, upon, under, and through the public lands and lands in
the National Forest System." Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
579, § 706(a), 90 Stat. 2743, 2793.
12. HAVLICK, supra note 7, at 7 1.
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so, it is unknown how many valid, pre-1976 rights-of-way exist in Utah.
Commentators estimate that "Utah counties have filed perhaps 10,000 to
15,000 R.S. 2477 right-of-way claims through national parks, national
monuments, and wilderness study areas, in addition to multiple-use pub-
lic lands."' 3 State laws exhibit little consensus among the states regarding
the best approach for managing claims that seek to establish local title to
such roads. 14 State laws differ as to the quantum of proof or the period of
public use required to establish a public right-of-way pursuant to R.S.
2477.15 Despite these inconsistencies, the lack of federal guidance on the
issue leaves courts with no option but to look to state laws to determine
what is required for the perfection of R.S. 2477 rights-of-way.1
6
II. THE PROBLEM: QUESTIONS CENTRAL TO THE R.S. 2477 DEBATE
At the heart of the R.S. 2477 debate lies a dispute over definitions
and terminology. The drafters of R.S. 2477 provided no guidance for
interpretation of the statute, leaving many questions unsettled. 17 Unset-
tled questions include: (1) should state or federal law define the statutes
ambiguous terms, thereby determining the scope of R.S. 2477 grants
state-by-state; (2) what constitutes a "highway"; (3) what constitutes
"construction"; and finally, (4) what lands qualify as "public lands, not
reserved for public uses"?
Two opposing positions frame the R.S. 2477 debate. Along with
state and local governments, lobbyists seeking to maintain off-road vehi-
cle access support broad definitions of the terms "highway" and "con-
struction," and argue that a very specific reservation is required to re-
move federal land from the category of "public lands, not reserved for
public uses."' 8 Groups that support this "access" approach often urge
their members to "take back" the roads to maintain broad public access
to federal lands.19 Advocates of the second, preservation-oriented ap-
proach argue that a stricter interpretation of R.S. 2477 terminology
should apply; that establishment of a right-of-way requires more than a
13. HOwARD G. WILSHIRE ET AL., THE AMERICAN WEST AT RISK: SCIENCE, MYTHS, AND
POLITICS OF LAND ABUSE AND RECOVERY 152 (2008).
14. R.S. 2477 REPORT, supra note 9, at 2.
15. Utah state law, for example, requires ten years of continuous public use. UTAH CODE
ANN. § 72-5-104(1) (2009).
16. See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 425 F.3d 735, 762 (10th Cir.
2005).
17. See Bret C. Birdsong, Road Rage and R.S. 2477: Judicial and Administrative Responsibil-
ity for Resolving Road Claims on Public Lands, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 523, 537 (2005) ("Despite spo-
radic litigation in recent years, legal questions persist about the exact showing necessary to validate a
claim, the scope of any valid right-of-way, and the role of state law in interpreting R.S. 2477.").
18. See, e.g., § 72-5-104.
19. See Official RS 2477 Rights-of-Way Homepage, http://www.rs2477roads.com (last vis-
ited Oct. 31, 2009).
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mere footpath. 20 These groups promote federal legislation to limit the
scope of R.S. 2477 rights-of-way to mechanically constructed roadways
that existed prior to R.S. 2477's repeal in 1976. Environmental groups
advocate this approach because limits on the use of roads through federal
lands can minimize erosion, protect native species, and preserve unde-
veloped areas.21
A. State or Federal "Law"?
"The most fundamental and controversial [R.S. 2477] issue is the
proper role of state law in validating the establishment of R.S. 2477
rights-of-way. 22 This threshold determination necessarily affects the
scope of the right. The federal government has inconsistently interpreted
the statute over time.2 3 This inconsistency springs from the reliance on
state laws-in the absence of federal guidance-to determine what con-
stitutes an R.S. 2477 right-of-way.24
B. What Is a "Highway"?
Black's Law Dictionary defines a highway as "any main route on
land, on water, or in the air" and a "main public road connecting towns
or cities. 25 In its 1993 Report to Congress, the United States Department
of the Interior ("DOI") explained the "highway" dilemma at base as a
conflict between an expansive definition of "highway" on one hand and a
more specific definition on the other. 6 One approach would define a
highway as any type of thoroughfare, be it a footpath, road, or primitive
trail which is open to the public. Under this definition, mere use is suffi-
cient to manifest public acceptance of the highway.27 Alternatively, many
environmental groups-and, at times, the federal government-contend
that a highway is only a vehicular road which connects "towns or cities."
Quoting a 1993 report written by the Congressional Research Service,
DOI noted that "the most likely interpretation of [R.S. 2477] is that a
highway was intended to mean a significant type of road, that is: 'one
that was open for public passage, received a significant amount of public
20. See Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, Revised Statute 2477 (RS 2477): Highway Rob-
bery Seeks to Swipe Scenic Lands from America's Wilderness Bank,
http://www.suwa.org/site/PageServer?pagename=workrs2477 (last visited Apr. 29, 2010).
21. James R. Rasband, Questioning the Rule of Capture Metaphor for Nineteenth Century
Public Land Law: A Look at R.S. 2477,35 ENVTL. L. 1005, 1019-20 (2005).
22. PAMELA BALDWIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., HIGHWAY RIGHTS OF WAY ON PUBLIC
LANDS: R.S. 2477 AND DISCLAIMERS OF INTEREST 41 (2003),
http://assets.opencrs.comlrpts/RL32142_20031107.pdf [hereinafter CRS REPORT].
23. See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 425 F.3d 735, 759-62 (10th
Cir. 2005) (describing the inconsistencies in federal agency interpretation of R.S. 2477 and deter-
mining that it was appropriate for "federal law [to] look[] to state law to flesh out details of interpre-
tation").
24. See, e.g., id. at 762-63.
25. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 431-32 (8th ed. 2004).
26. R.S. 2477 REPORT, supra note 9, at 11-12.
27. CRS REPORT, supra note 22, at 38-40.
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use, had some degree of construction or improvement, and that con-
nected cities, towns, or other significant places, rather than simply two
places."'
28
C. What Constitutes "Construction"?
Similar to the opposing views of the definition of "highway," the
debate over the definition of "construction" can be summarized as a con-
flict between the broad and narrow meanings of the term. Proponents of
the broad definition view "construction" as continuous use over a period
of time that establishes the equivalent of a beaten path. Advocates of the
narrow definition argue that affirmative road-building steps should be
required. As discussed in more detail below, the DOI approach to "con-
struction" has often fluctuated; while "consistently maintain[ing] that
some construction must have taken place," the DOI has also at times
"construed 'construction' broadly. 29
The Tenth Circuit's 2005 decision in Southern Utah Wilderness Al-
liance v. Bureau of Land Management30 ("SUWA") largely resolved the
definition of "construction" for Tenth Circuit litigants by determining
that "mechanical construction" could serve as evidence of public use, but
was not required to prove a R.S. 2477 right-of-way. 31 The court con-
cluded that:
[T]he common law standard of use[], which takes evidence of con-
struction into consideration along with other evidence of use by the
general public, seems better calculated to distinguish between rights
of way genuinely accepted through continual public use over a leng-
thy period of time, and routes which . . . served limited purposes for
limited periods of time, and never formed part of the public transpor-
tation system.
32
D. What Are "Public Lands, Not Reserved for Public Uses"?
Because there are a variety of purposes for federal land grants, the
definition of "public lands, not reserved for public uses" also generates
controversy. 33 Proponents of one approach argue that a federal land res-
ervation must be particularized and explicit to exempt it from the R.S.
2477 grant. For example, the establishment of a grazing district would
not be classified as land that is reserved for public uses. Rather, "re-
served lands are those that have been withdrawn or dedicated for a more
particular purpose, such as a National Park or Indian Reservation."
34
28. R.S. 2477 REPORT, supra note 9, at 12.
29. CRS REPORT, supra note 22, at 50.
30. 425 F.3d 735 (10th Cir. 2005).
31. Id. at 778.
32. Id. at 782.
33. See R.S. 2477 REPORT, supra note 9, at 12 (explaining the disparities in definition for
"public lands, not reserved for public uses").
34. Id.
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Alternatively, environmental groups arguing for a more restrictive R.S.
2477 standard maintain that any lands set aside for any specific public
purpose by the federal government should be exempt from R.S. 2477
claims.
35
III. THE ELUSIVE ANSWER: EACH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT
(UNSUCCESSFULLY) AT'TEMPTS TO RESOLVE THE R.S. 2477 DEBATE
Since the repeal of R.S. 2477, Congress, DOI, and courts have all
attempted to resolve the conflict between federal land management re-
gimes and local government property rights over R.S. 2477 roads. 36 Be-
cause of the complicated nuances of the issue, and with the control over
potential rights-of-way across public lands at stake, all attempts have
fallen short of a permanent solution.
A. Congressional Attempts to Resolve the Issue
Congress's inability to come to a consensus regarding R.S. 2477-
whether they are weighing the scope of the R.S. 2477 grant, time limits
for filing R.S. 2477 claims, or the question of whether state or federal
laws govern these issues-has fueled the controversy surrounding the
statute. Congress attempted to address R.S. 2477 roads in 1991 by pass-
ing H.R. 1096, which would have imposed a cutoff date for filing new
R.S. 2477 claims. 37 While the bill passed the House of Representatives,
"[t]he Senate adjourned without acting on H.R. 1096. ",38 Again in 1993,
lawmakers unsuccessfully attempted to pass a House appropriations bill
that would have imposed a moratorium on processing R.S. 2477 claims
until federal legislation addressed the issue.
39
Even the most recent congressional efforts have failed. In 2003,0
and then again in 2005,4 Colorado Representative Mark Udall proposed
House bills which narrowly constrained R.S. 2477 rights-of-way. The
bills defined construction as "an intentional physical act ... using me-
chanical tools" and imposed a four year time limit for the filing of R.S.
2477 claims.42 In the latest unsuccessful attempts to legislate on this is-
sue, New Mexico Representative Steve Pearce introduced House bills in
35. Id. More information about the large area of unreserved lands managed by the BLM is
available at the BLM's Land Resources and Information Homepage,
http://www.blm.gov/publicjland statistics/resources.htm.
36. R.S. 2477 fights-of-way can also exist on National Forest System Lands, managed by the
United States Department of Agriculture, to the extent that the fights-of-way were perfected prior to
the date of reservation of the lands comprising the relevant national forest.
37. See H.R. 1096, 102d Cong. (1991).
38. R.S. 2477 REPORT, supra note 9, at 4.
39. H.R. 5503, 102d Cong. (2d Sess. 1992).
40. H.R. 1639, 108th Cong. (2003). The 2003 bill was cosponsored by 59 democrats and no
republicans, and never came to a vote in the House.
41. H.R. 3447, 109th Cong. (2005). The 2005 bill also never came to a vote in the House.
42. Id.; H.R. 1639.
[Vol. 87:3
2010] WILDERNESS SOCIETY V. KANE COUNTY, UTAH 731
200643 and again in 200744 that favored state and local governments. The
bills would have applied state laws to R.S. 2477 questions, perpetuating
existing uncertainties.45
B. DOI's Attempts to Resolve the Issue
1. Formal Rulemaking
Prior to the repeal of R.S. 2477, the Department of Interior provided
very little guidance with respect to the meaning of the statute, and gener-
ally took a hands-off approach to R.S. 2477.46 The Secretary of the Inte-
rior applied state law to R.S. 2477 with a "federal law reasonableness
limit on the scope" of a road grant.47 In 1938, the Secretary published a
regulation instructing that the R.S. 2477 "grant becomes effective upon
the construction or establishing of highways, in accordance with state
laws, over public lands not reserved for public uses. ' 48 This position was
largely maintained by DOI until FLPMA repealed R.S. 2477 in 1976.49
After the repeal, changes in agency policy generally corresponded
with changes in political control of the executive branch. 50 Starting in the
early 1980's during the Carter administration, Deputy Solicitor Frederick
Ferguson announced that R.S. 2477 was a question of federal law, and
that the plain meaning of "construction" for the purpose of interpreting
R.S. 2477 was mechanical construction, 5' which required such activities
as "grading, paving, placing culverts, etc."52 In 1989, Ronald Reagan's
Secretary of the Interior Donald Hodel issued a new R.S. 2477 policy
43. H.R. 6298, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006).
44. H.R. 308, 110th Cong. (2007).
45. H.R. 6298 § 5 reads, in its entirety:
(5) The applicable laws of each State govern the resolution of issues relating to the valid-
ity and scope of R.S. 2477 rights-of-way, including-
(A) what constitutes a highway and its essential characteristics;
(B) what actions are required to establish a public highway;
(C) the length of time of public use, if any, necessary to establish a public highway and
resulting R.S. 2477 right-of-way;
(D) the necessity of mechanical construction to establish a pubic highway and resulting
R.S. 2477 right-of-way; and
(E) the sufficiency of public construction alone without proof of a certain number of
years of continuous public use to establish a public highway and resulting R.S. 2477
ight-of-way.
H.R. 6298 § 5 (emphasis added).
46. See R.S. 2477 REPORT, supra note 9, at 20.
47. Rasband, supra note 21, at 1026-27.
48. R.S. 2477 REPORT, supra note 9, at 20 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 43
C.F.R. pt. 244.55 (1938)); id. app. 11, exhibit C (providing full-text of regulation).
49. See id. at 20.
50. See Rasband, supra note 21, at 1039.
51. Under the Ferguson-era policy, construction required more than "mere use." Letter from
Frederick N. Ferguson, Deputy Solicitor, to James W. Moorman, Assistant Attorney Gen. 5 (Apr.
28, 1980), in R.S. 2477 REPORT, supra note 9, app. II, exhibit J [hereinafter Ferguson Letter]. "If
actual use were the only criterion, innumerable jeep trails, wagon roads and other access ways-
some of them ancient ... might qualify as public highways under R.S. 2477." Id. at 7.
52. Id. at 8; see also Rasband, supra note 21, at 1029.
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statement in response to the Tenth Circuit's decision in Sierra Club v.
Hodel.5 3 Known as the "Hodel Policy," it proclaimed that the scope of a
right-of-way was a question of state law and propounded a long-term use
standard for determining the validity of a right-of-way, meaning that
maintaining a road for many years was tantamount to construction. 54 The
Hodel policy, in stark contrast to the Ferguson policy, established public
highways as any public route open to vehicular, pedestrian, or pack ani-
mal traffic.55
In 1994, during the Clinton administration, DOI proposed new R.S.
2477 regulations that would have implemented the suggestions made by
DOI's 1993 R.S. 2477 Report to Congress 56 by creating a comprehensive
federal policy for resolving R.S. 2477 claims. 57 The proposed rules were
"intended to clarify the meaning of [R.S. 2477] and provide a workable
administrative process and standards for recognizing valid claims, '58 and
imposed a two-year time limit on the filing of R.S. 2477 claims, which
were to be resolved based on federal law. 59 However, the rules were de-
railed by another change in the Congressional majority, 60 and marked a
final end to formal R.S. 2477 rulemaking by enacting a permanent mora-
torium on agency R.S. 2477 rulemaking without Congressional authori-
zation.
6 1
2. Agency Policy Interpretations
In 2003, the United States Department of Interior ("DOI") signed a
Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") with the State of Utah in an
effort to resolve Utah's R.S. 2477 controversies.6 2 The MOU acknowl-
edged "publicly traveled and regularly maintained roads" in Utah that
were "unquestionably part of the State's transportation infrastructure"
and were not part of national parks, refuges, and wilderness areas. 63 En-
vironmental groups contended that the MOU was insufficiently protec-
tive of Utah's wilderness areas because it incorporated an expansive de-
53. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1083 (10th Cir. 1988) (concluding that state law
should control the scope of the right-of-way).
54. Memorandum from Susan Recce, Acting Assistant Sec'y, Fish and Wildlife and Parks, to
Donald Paul Hodel, Sec'y, Dep't of the Interior 2 (Mar. 8, 1989), in R.S. 2477 REPORT, supra note
9, app. 11, exhibit K.
55. Id.
56. R.S. 2477 REPORT, supra note 9, at 55.
57. Revised Statute 2477 Rights-of-Way, 59 Fed. Reg. 39,216 (Aug. 1, 1994).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 39,222.
60. Rasband, supra note 21, at 1031-32.
61. H.R. 3610, 104th Cong., 110 Stat. 3009 (2d Sess. 1996) (enacted).
62. Memorandum of Understanding Between the State of Utah and the Dep't of the Interior
on State & County Rd. Acknowledgment (Apr. 9, 2003), available at
http://doi.gov/archive/news03_News Releaseslmours2477.htm.
63. Press Release, Dep't of the Interior, Memorandum of Understanding: Dep't of the Interior
& State of Utah: Resolution of R.S. 2477 Right-of-Way Claims, available at
http://www.interior.gov/news03-News-Releases/moutalkingpoints.htm.
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finition of "highway." 64 Despite lingering doubts, Secretary of the Inte-
rior Gale Norton announced that the R.S. 2477 issues in Utah were, at
long last, resolved: "[B]y working collaboratively with the state of Utah,
we are able to resolve a long-disputed issue that may otherwise have lead
[sic] to costly and lengthy litigation." 65 The litigation, however, per-
sisted.
On March 22, 2006, following the Tenth Circuit's SUWA decision,
Secretary Norton sent an instructional memorandum ("IM") to DOI's
departments, directing a change in R.S. 2477 policy to ensure consis-
tency with the SUWA decision. 66 More specifically, the IM instructed
that the validity of R.S. 2477 claims were to be determined pursuant to
state law and that mechanical construction of a road was not necessary to
establish an R.S. 2477 right-of-way. Further, "the scope of an R.S. 2477
right of way [was] limited by the established usage of the route as of the
date of repeal of [R.S. 2477]. "67 Under the guidelines set forth in the IM,
which represent the most recent expression of DOI policy related to R.S.
2477, local governments are permitted to maintain R.S. 2477 roads pro-
vided that the maintenance "preserves the status quo."
68
C. The Tenth Circuit Attempts to Resolve the Issue
1. The SUWA Case
69
The Tenth Circuit's decision in SUWA significantly affected the
R.S. 2477 debate. In this landmark 2005 case, Judge McConnell ruled on
several important R.S. 2477 issues.70 SUWA was an action brought by
environmental groups to oppose the grading of sixteen roads or trails on
BLM land by three Southern Utah counties. 71 The plaintiffs claimed that
"the Counties had engaged in unlawful road construction activities" 72 and
64. Press Release, The Wilderness Society & Earthjustice, R.S. 2477 Spin vs. Reality: Dep't
of Interior & State of Utah April 9, 2003 Memorandum of Understanding on "Resolution of R.S.
2477 Right of Way Claims" (Apr. 10, 2003) (on file with author).
65. Press Release, Dep't of the Interior, Interior and State of Utah Reach Landmark Agree-
ment on R.S. 2477 Rights of Way Issue (Apr. 9, 2003), available at
http://www.doi.gov/archivelnews/O3-News-Releases/O30409a.htm.
66. Memorandum from Gale A. Norton, See'y, Dep't of the Interior, Departmental Implemen-
tation of S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 425 F.3d 735 (10th Cir. 2005);
Revocation of Jan. 22, 1997, Interim Policy; Revocation of Dec. 7, 1988, Policy (Mar. 22, 2006),
available at http://www.doi.gov/archive/news/06_NewsReleases/Norton_3-22-06.pdf [hereinafter
Norton Memorandum].
67. Guidelines for Implementation of SUWA v. BLM Principles, in Norton Memorandum,
supra note 66, at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v.
Bureau of Land Mgmt., 425 F.3d 735, 747 (10th Cir. 2005)) [hereinafter Guidelines for SUWA].
68. Guidelines for SUWA, supra note 67, at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting S.
Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 425 F.3d 735, 756 (10th Cir. 2005)).
69. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt. (SUWA), 425 F.3d 735 (1Oth Cir.
2005).
70. See id.
71. Id. at 742.
72. Id.
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that BLM, by not taking action, had violated its duties under a number of
federal statutes.73
The Tenth Circuit first concluded that BLM did not have the "au-
thority to make binding determinations on the validity of the rights of
way granted [under R.S. 2477]." 74 The court went on to hold that state
law applied to R.S. 2477 conflicts. While the DOI's proposed 1994 rules
would have allowed BLM to regulate R.S. 2477 rights of way, the 1996
congressional moratorium on formal R.S. 2477 rulemaking by DOI and
its subdivisions (including the BLM) explicitly deprived the BLM of any
regulation authority over R.S. 2477 claims. 75 Additionally, the court
found that the policy was not entitled to Chevron deference because it
had shown evidence of inconsistency since 1976.76 Thus, "where Con-
gress has taken action to prevent implementation of agency rules, and
those rules have never been adopted by formal agency action, we do not
think it appropriate for a court to defer to those rules in the interpretation
of a federal statute."
77
The SUWA court upheld the district court's determination that the
burden of proof for establishing a valid right-of-way fell on the R.S.
2477 claimant.78 However, the court rejected the argument advanced by
SUWA and the BLM that "mechanical construction" was required to
perfect an R.S. 2477 right-of-way.79 Instead, the court held that a right-
of-way can be established by "continued use of the road by the public for
such length of time and under such circumstances as to clearly indicate
an intention on the part of the public to accept the grant." 80 Next, the
court held that, for the purpose of R.S. 2477, a "highway" must be a
route with continuous public use. Notably, however, the Tenth Circuit
remanded to the district court to determine whether a route which did not
lead to an "identifiable destination[]" may nonetheless constitute a high-
way. 8' Finally, the court adopted a relatively formal public use require-
ment by holding that land withdrawn by the federal government under
the 1910 Coal Withdrawal was not a reservation for public use.82 In sum,
the SUWA decision, which exhibited the characteristics of the traditional
73. See id. ("SUWA ... allege[d] that the Counties had engaged in unlawful road construc-
tion activities and that the BLM had violated its duties under FLPMA, the Antiquities Act, and the
National Environmental Policy Act, by not taking action [to stop the road construction]." (citations
omitted)).
74. Id. at 757.
75. See id. at 756-57; Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
§ 108, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-18 (1996).
76. SUWA, 425 F.3d at 760.
77. Id. at 761.
78. Id. at 768.
79. Id. at 782.
80. Id. at 781 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lindsay Land & Live Stock Co. v.
Churnos, 285 P. 646, 648 (Utah 1929)).
81. Id. at 783-84.
82. Id. at 784-85.
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state law approach to the R.S. 2477 issue, became the foremost authority
on R.S. 2477 in the Tenth Circuit.
83
2. Wilderness Society v. Kane County, Utah84
In August 2009, a Tenth Circuit court divided 2-1 declined to ex-
tend the reasoning relied on for nearly five years after SUWA. In a deci-
sion for the plaintiff environmental groups, the Tenth Circuit's holding in
Wilderness Society has the potential to impact the next generation of R.S.
2477 litigants.
a. Facts
Beginning in the summer of 2003, representatives of Kane County,
Utah ("the County") 85 removed BLM and National Park Service signs
that restricted motor vehicle access in four federally-managed and ecol-
ogically-sensitive areas. 86 In all, the County removed thirty-one signs
from purported R.S. 2477 roads throughout the Grand Staircase-
Escalante National Monument, Glen Canyon National Recreation Area,
Paria Canyon-Vermillion Cliffs Wilderness Area, and Moquith Mountain
Wilderness Study Area.87
Just over a year after taking down the signs, the County erected its
own signage, in some places replacing the federal signage that it had
removed the previous year. At least sixty-three of the new County signs
opened routes to motor vehicles that were previously closed to motorized
travel under the federal management plans. 88 Shortly thereafter, the BLM
sent a letter to the County requesting that it discontinue the removal and
replacement of federal signs.
In seeming defiance of the BLM request, the County enacted the
"Ordinance to Designate and Regulate the Use of Off-Highway Vehi-
cles," or Ordinance 2005-03 ("the Ordinance"), in August 2005. The
Ordinance purported to authorize the County to "post signs" designating
roads as open to motor vehicle use.89 In October 2005, plaintiffs Wilder-
83. Norton Memorandum, supra note 66, at 4. But see SUWA, 425 F.3d at 787 (departing
from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals precedent on the coal withdrawal issue).
84. 581 F.3d 1198 (10th Cir. 2009).
85. Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that those responsible for the removal of the signs
were Kane County Commissioner Mark Habbeshaw and Sheriff Lamont Smith. Complaint for
Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 15, Wilderness Soc'y v. Kane County, Utah, 470 F. Supp. 2d
1300 (D. Utah 2006) (No. 2:05-CV-854 TC), 2005 WL 3197808 [hereinafter Wilderness Soc'y
Compl.].
86. Wilderness Soc 'y, 581 F.3d at 1205-06.
87. Here, the majority of the public lands in question were in Grand Staircase-Escalante
National Monument: "Nearly 1.3 million of the 1.6 million acres of federal public land in Kane
County lie within Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument." Id. at 1205. Grand Staircase,
created in 1996 by President Clinton, is managed by the BLM, rather than the National Parks Ser-
vice. VISIONS OF THE GRAND STAIRCASE-ESCALANTE: EXAMINING UTAH'S NEWEST NATIONAL
MONUMENT, at xiii (Robert B. Keiter et al. eds., 1998).
88. Wilderness Soc'y, 581 F.3d at 1206-07.
89. Id. at 1207.
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ness Society and Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (collectively,
"TWS") filed a complaint in federal district court.90 TWS claimed that
both the County's removal of federal signs and the enactment of the
county Ordinance conflicted with existing federal land management
plans, which designated the routes in question as closed to motor vehicle
use.9 1 TWS based its argument on the theory that the federal plans pre-
empted County actions under the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution.92
In response, the County repealed the Ordinance during December
200693 and filed a motion to dismiss in which it alleged that the Suprem-
acy Clause did not preempt the County's actions because, pursuant to
R.S. 2477, the County possessed valid rights-of-way to the roads in ques-
tion.94 The County also challenged the federal court's jurisdiction, argu-
ing that TWS lacked standing and that the court did not have subject
matter jurisdiction over the controversy.
b. The District Court Decision
The District Court disagreed with the County, and exercised its ju-
risdiction to rule on TWS's claims in August 2006.95 In May 2008, the
court granted TWS's motion for summary judgment, reasoning that Kane
County's failure to prove its R.S. 2477 rights-of-way in a previous quiet
title action prevented the County from using its purported property rights
to contravene federal land management policies.96 Because the County
had not clearly established property rights along the roadways, the court
held that the County's decisions to remove federal signage and expand
trail use to include off-road vehicles were preempted by federal law un-
der the Supremacy Clause.97
90. Id. For their specific injuries-in-fact, Plaintiffs submitted declarations of their members
"alleg[ing] harms to their health, recreational, scientific, spiritual, educational, aesthetic, and other
interests." Id. at 1210. The declarations specifically stated that members of TWS often use "areas
adjacent to" some of the roads in question, that they "seek[] out and prefer[] to use those federal
public land[s] that are . . . not burdened by [off-road vehicle] use," and that their "interests are di-
rectly affected and harmed by Kane County's actions in erecting signs and adopting [the]
[O]rdinance." Id. at 1210-11 (third alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
declarations from plaintiffs' group members).
91. Of the public lands in Kane County, BLM "manages about 1.6 million acres.., and the
National Park Service about 400,000 acres." Wilderness Soc'y v. Kane County, Utah, 470 F. Supp.
2d 1300, 1303 (D. Utah 2006).
92. See Wilderness Soc 'y Compl., supra note 85, at 18-19.
93. Wilderness Soc'y, 581 F.3d at 1208.
94. See Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at I, Wilderness Soc'y, 470 F. Supp. 2d 1300 (No.
2:05-CV-854 TC), 2006 WL 5986753; Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 4, Wilder-
ness Soc'y, 470 F. Supp. 2d 1300 (No. 2:05-CV-854 TC), 2006 WL 813473.
95. Wilderness Soc 'y, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 1304.
96. Wilderness Soc'y v. Kane County, Utah, 560 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1165-66 (D. Utah 2008).
97. See id. at 165.
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c. The Tenth Circuit Affirms the District Court
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit narrowed the issues to be decided,98
stating that the only issues before the court included (1) whether federal
jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims was proper, and (2) whether a
county may "exercise management authority over federal lands in a
manner that conflicts with the federal management regime without prov-
ing that it possesses valid R.S. 2477 rights of way."99 Although the case
involved hotly-debated R.S. 2477 rights, the Tenth Circuit made it clear
that it was not deciding "the validity of [Kane County's] purported R.S.
2477 rights of way over federal land." 1°°
i. Federal Jurisdiction
The Tenth Circuit held in favor of the plaintiffs TWS on all jurisdic-
tional issues, including standing, mootness, and joinder. To establish
standing, TWS was required to satisfy the constitutional standing re-
quirements of Article IH, including: (1) injury in fact; (2) a causal link
between the TWS's injury and the County's actions; and (3) that a favor-
able resolution by the court would redress the injury. °1 The majority
opinion reasoned that "[i]n the environmental context, a plaintiff who has
repeatedly visited a particular site, has imminent plans to do so again,
and whose interests are harmed by a defendant's conduct has suffered
injury in fact."'' 0 2 The court reasoned that declarations from members of
the plaintiff organizations adequately established injury in fact.'0 3 Simi-
larly, the court found that the County's actions caused the harm alleged
by the TWS because there was a "substantial likelihood" that the Coun-
ty's replacement of federal signs increased off-highway vehicle usage on
98. In its opening brief, Kane County named five issues for review:
1. Whether the District Court erred in finding that R.S. 2477 rights-of-way do not exist
unless and until adjudicated in court.
2. Whether the District Court erred in finding it had subject matter jurisdiction of TWS's
constitutional claims.
3. Whether the District Court erred in deciding that the State of Utah was not a necessary
party and in failing to address whether the United States was a necessary and indispensi-
ble party.
4. Whether the District Court erred in denying Kane County's motion to dismiss on
grounds of constitutional and prudential mootness.
5. Whether the District Court erred in denying Kane County's motions to strike and re-
quest for attorneys' fees by merely deciding it would not consider the improper materials.
Appellants' Opening Brief at 3, Wilderness Soc'y, 581 F.3d 1198 (No. 08-4090), 2008 WL 4212652.
99. Wilderness Soc'y, 581 F.3d at 1205.
100. Id. at 1219.
101. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
102. Wilderness Soc'y, 581 F.3d at 1210 (citing Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142,
1149 (2009)). Declarants in Wilderness Society alleged harms to their "health, recreational, scien-
tific, spiritual, educational, aesthetic, and other interests" arising from increased off-road vehicle
routes on the BLM lands in question. Id.
103. While this Comment does not address in detail the interesting standing issue presented in
Wilderness Society, the history of the standing doctrine, especially in the environmental context, is
"one of pendulum shifts: first toward generous standing, then back toward more restrictive standing,
then back again toward a more generous approach." Daniel A. Farber, A Place-Based Theory of
Standing, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1505, 1508 (2008).
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the roads.' 04 Finally, the plaintiffs' complaint satisfied the redressability
requirement because an injunction requiring Kane County to remove its
signs and prohibiting the County from taking similar actions in the future
"would likely dissuade at least one person from driving an [off-road ve-
hicle] on a disputed route."'
0 5
The court also determined that TWS's claim satisfied the require-
ments for prudential standing.' °6 The court reasoned TWS's complaint
was not a generalized grievance, "but rather one that particularly impacts
their members."' 0 7 Furthermore, the court noted that "[i]f the zone of
interest test applies in a preemption case, it is clear that the environ-
mental plaintiffs fall within the zone of interest protected by the Suprem-
acy Clause."'08
In considering mootness, the Tenth Circuit found that the case was
not mooted by Defendant's removal of some of the signs permitting mo-
tor vehicle use on the routes in question or by the County's repeal of
Ordinance 2005-03 in the wake of TWS's complaint. The court recog-
nized that the County only rescinded the Ordinance to "secure the most
successful legal resolution," and that the County Commissioner himself
hinted at his intention to reenact the ordinance after the resolution of the
litigation.1°9
Finally, because the court was "not passing on the validity of any al-
leged R.S. 2477 rights of way," the court determined neither the State of
Utah nor the United States was a necessary party. 10 The majority noted
that it would have been improper to adjudicate the R.S. 2477 claims be-
cause the United States was not a party and because the County had not
filed a Quiet Title Act claim.
ii. Preemption
In a rather unique and controversial step, the Tenth Circuit found
that the Supremacy Clause, even without an associated statutory right of
action, was a valid cause of action."' As a result, TWS's preemption
claims succeeded on the merits. The Tenth Circuit stated that, where the
County's actions conflict with federal land management plans, the Coun-
104. Wilderness Soc'y, 581 F.3d at 1213.
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004) (explaining that
the requirements for judicially-imposed prudential standing include "the general prohibition on a
litigant's raising another person's legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances
more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff's
complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked" (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984))).
107. Wilderness Soc'y, 581 F.3d at 1217.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1214 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kane County Comm'n).
110. Id. at 1218.
Ill. Id. at 1216.
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ty may not exercise management authority over purported R.S. 2477
roads without first proving the existence of valid rights-of-way in
court."12 The court refused to allow Kane County to "defend [this] pre-
emption suit by simply alleging the existence of R.S. 2477 rights of
way."'113
To determine whether state law was, in fact conflicting with or ob-
structing federal law, the court evaluated each of the federal lands' re-
spective management plans. While the management plans stipulate that
the managing agency "may not encroach upon 'valid existing rights,"'
the court denied the existence of valid existing rights because Kane
County had yet to establish the R.S. 2477 routes in court."14 The majority
concluded by noting that the County's "claimed rights may well have
been created and vested decades ago, but until it proves ... those rights,
we agree with the district court that its regulations on federal lands that
otherwise conflict with federal law are preempted."
' 15
d. Judge McConnell's Dissent
In his dissent, Judge McConnell-the author of the landmark SUWA
decision-took issue with the majority's treatment of preemption as a
valid constitutional cause of action."16 McConnell argued that the "plain-
tiffs assert no legal claim upon which relief may be granted" because
"[t]he Supremacy Clause is not an independent source of rights but a rule
of priority that determines who wins when state and federal law con-
flict." 17 Judge McConnell attacked the merits of the plaintiffs' case, ar-
guing that the provision in the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Mo-
nument Management Plan preserving "valid existing rights" precluded a
preemption claim, thereby removing any conflict between federal policy
and local laws. Moreover, Judge McConnell reasoned that "even if there
were a conflict between county law and federal law, [the court] cannot
112. This portion of the Tenth Circuit's holding conformed to their earlier conclusion in the
related case of Kane County, Utah v. Salazar. 562 F.3d 1077 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that the BLM
has no duty to determine the validity of all potential R.S. 2477 rights-of-way in preparing a travel
management plan designating routes for public motor vehicle travel in the Grand Staircase-
Escalante National Monument).
113. Wilderness Soc'y, 581 F.3d at 1221.
114. Id. at 1220.
115. Id. at 1221.
116. While Judge McConnell admits that preemption can be used "as a defense to the enforce-
ment against [a partyl of state regulations that conflicted with federal law," he did not agree with the
majority that a "third party [could] bring a freestanding preemption claim to enforce compliance
with federal law." Id. at 1233 (McConnell, J., dissenting). Judge McConnell also disagreed that the
environmental groups had standing to bring the suit, alleging that the groups were just "interested
outsiders," id. at 123 1, without a "legally protected interest," id. at 1229.
117. Id. at 1234 (citing Andrews v. Maher, 525 F.2d 113, 119 (2d Cir. 1975)) (arguing that
FLPMA does not contain citizen enforcement provisions and the Supremacy Clause is a "fundamen-
tal structural principle of federalism" not an "independent source of rights").
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determine which prevails without adjudicating the County's claimed
rights-of-way."' 8
IV. ANALYSIS
Both the district court and Tenth Circuit emphasized that Wilder-
ness Society is not about the adjudication of R.S. 2477 rights-of-way
between Kane County and the federal government. However, by attempt-
ing to resolve the apparent discrepancy between the presumption favor-
ing the federal government property owner and the widely-held view that
the R.S. 2477 rights-of-way are recognized without administrative for-
malities, Wilderness Society could signal a Tenth Circuit shift towards a
more "environmentally friendly" resolution of R.S. 2477 disputes.
A. The Significance of Wilderness Society
The SUWA rule recognizing rights-of-way without formal adjudica-
tion has proven itself to be unworkable in the cases where a local gov-
ernment is attempting to open new routes or expand seldom-used routes.
Of the roads throughout the West today, thousands are unproven R.S.
2477 rights-of-way. The majority of these rights-of-way do not give rise
to conflict, however, because they have been used continuously for many
years, are well-established, and do not traverse sensitive areas. In these
cases, formal adjudication is impractical and unnecessary. Conflicts
arise, however, when counties stretch the application of R.S. 2477 to
open new roads, re-establish rarely used trails, or continue to use unim-
proved roads in recently-designated federal wilderness areas. Such
"highways" often do not look like roads at all, and often cross environ-
mentally sensitive areas. For these types of cases, recognition of a right-
of-way without a formal process or adjudication inevitably leads to liti-
gation.
By rejecting Kane County's argument that the routes in question
were "valid existing rights," and by requiring that the rights-of-way be
proven in court before being asserted as a defense, the Tenth Circuit in
effect adopted a more straightforward rule governing county manage-
ment of routes on public lands. While Wilderness Society does not ex-
pressly overturn SUWA,"1 9 the Tenth Circuit sends a strong message:
state and local governments must prove R.S. 2477 rights-of-way in court
before exercising unilateral management authority over roads on federal
lands. While not a permanent solution to the R.S. 2477 dispute, the ma-
jority's rule adds some certainty to the treatment of alleged R.S. 2477
118. Id. at 1239 (alterations omitted).
119. Appellant's Petition for Panel Rehearing & Request for Rehearing en Banc at 15, Wilder-
ness Soc'y, 581 F.3d 1198 (No. 08-4090). In fact, the County argued that TWS broke new ground on
the R.S. 2477 issue and that "the [Tenth Circuit] panel effectively overrules SUWA 'by implica-
tion."' Id.
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rights-of-way and offers the promise of minimizing county actions on
federal lands that foster R.S. 2477 disputes.
Importantly, the Tenth Circuit's decision to grant standing to the
environmental plaintiffs promotes transparency and certainty. The Wil-
derness Society decision suggests that all regular users of federal lands
will likely have standing to sue state and local governments that take
actions on federal lands in contravention of federal management plans.
Furthermore, the concept established in Wilderness Society-that local
governments must prove the existence of R.S. 2477 rights-of-way before
those rights will be recognized as a defense-adds a substantial caveat to
the traditional view that R.S. 2477 rights-of-way may be established
without "administrative formalities." While state and local governments
may continue to maintain the "status quo" of purported R.S. 2477 roads
without formally proving their rights through a quiet title action, 20 they
may not rely on unproven R.S. 2477 rights-of-way to defend uses of such
roads that are inconsistent with federal land management policy.' 2' In the
several decades of Tenth Circuit jurisprudence related to R.S. 2477, 
22
Wilderness Society represents the first occasion in which the court favors
the interests of the federal government-not to mention those of an envi-
ronmental plaintiff-over the interests of a local government. The impli-
cations of this decision could be wide-reaching: because of the West's
expertise on R.S. 2477, DOI and other circuit courts have historically
deferred to the decisions of both the Ninth and Tenth Circuits. 
23
B. An Appeal for a Preservation-Oriented Approach
To lend certainty and closure to the R.S. 2477 debate while concur-
rently protecting states' rights and the environment, the federal approach
to R.S. 2477 must reach three objectives: (1) impose a time limit for fil-
ing of claims; (2) define ambiguous terminology from the R.S. 2477 sta-
tute; and (3) provide for an administrative process to resolve claims in a
timely and efficient manner. This approach would mirror the Department
of Interior's 1994 proposal,124 and be very similar to the Udall proposals
of 2003 and 2005.125
"The uncertainty attending [the] issue [of R.S. 2477] makes plan-
ning and development difficult, compromises an agency's mission, and
undermines the relationship between federal officials and the people they
120. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt. (SUWA), 425 F.3d 735, 756 (10th
Cir. 2005).
121. Wilderness Soc'y, 581 F.3d at 1219-21.
122. See, e.g., SUWA, 425 F.3d at 785; Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1074 (10th Cir.
1988).
123. See, e.g., Norton Memorandum, supra note 66 (adopting the Tenth Circuit's approach in
SUWA as a DOI policy).
124. Revised Statute 2477 Rights-of-Way, 59 Fed. Reg. 39,216, 39,216-17 (Aug. 1, 1994).
125. H.R. 3447, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 1639, 108th Cong. (2003).
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serve."1 26 The authority of federal agencies to manage access to federal
lands is critical. 27 As demonstrated in Wilderness Society, the federal
government's ability to protect and manage its land resources is severely
undermined by state and local government actions that expand access to
R.S. 2477 roads. 28 The economic planning and development goals of
state and local governments are also compromised by the indeterminate
state of R.S. 2477.129
As populations grow and open spaces disappear, it becomes ever
more important to protect the lands set aside by the federal government
as wilderness areas, national monuments, or for other public enjoyment
purposes. 130 Because "[w]ilderness areas and Wilderness Study Areas
(WSAs) are roadless by definition,"' 3' the continued influx of R.S. 2477
claims compromises the federal government's ability to set aside wilder-
ness areas in the future.' 32 The DOI has recognized the "potential to mis-
use [R.S. 2477] greatly in a way that would destroy so much important
wildlife and recreational lands and corresponding local and regional
economies."' 33 The comprehensive approach advocated in this Comment
provides superior protection to environmental interests by making it
more difficult for local governments to claim continuously-used trails as
R.S. 2477 roads.
The federal government's failure to finally resolve the R.S. 2477 is-
sue is troublesome. Nearly 35 years after the statute's repeal, disputes
persist. While imposing a time limit for the filing of R.S. 2477 claims
would not relieve the tension inherent in the debate, it would ensure that
the process does not become even more contentious in the future. The
longer Congress waits to impose a time limit for filing claims, the more
uncertain the R.S. 2477 issue will become.134 Confusion over which
routes were established prior to 1976 is pervasive: as early as 1993, DOI
noted that "[i)ncomplete records and confusion over the law and its ap-
126. R.S. 2477 REPORT, supra note 9, at 33.
127. See Birdsong, supra note 17, at 533 (describing the problems that R.S. 2477's uncertain-
ties present for both federal land managers and state and local governments).
128. See 59 Fed. Reg. 39,216-17.
129. Birdsong, supra note 17, at 533 ("State and local governments also need to plan for the
development of road networks within their jurisdiction. The lack of certainty over whether various
roads over public lands are valid rights-of-way impedes their ability to plan for economic growth
and to provide road safety.").
130. Because of the burdensome effects that roads have on the environment, it is ever more
important to adopt a hard line when it comes to opening the purported right of ways. See Rasband,
supra note 24, at 1019-20.
131. R.S. 2477 REPORT, supra note 9, at 38.
132. "If primitive access routes are recognized as R.S. 2477 highways, large areas of public
land in some areas currently proposed for wilderness designation by various public-interest groups
may be disqualified." Id.; see also Rasband, supra note 21, at 1019.
133. R.S. 2477 REPORT, supra note 9, at 39.
134. See Revised Statute 2477 Rights-of-Way, 59 Fed. Reg. 39,216, 39,222 (Aug. I, 1994).
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plication make it difficult to inventory, thus assess, impacts of potential
R.S. 2477 claims."
' 135
Finally, because of the ubiquitous presence of R.S. 2477 roads in
the United States, federal legislation is preferable to the current ad hoc
system that relies on inconsistent state laws. "While existing rights pur-
suant to R.S. 2477 were not terminated [by FLPMA], their preservation
did not provide prospective, unrestricted authority to create or improve
highways without regard for the purposes of [federal] land management
systems, or other environmental and resource protection laws."'136 Ac-
cordingly, federal lands should not be "'at the mercy of [future] state
legislation' and [changes in] state common law."' 137 A federal law that
establishes universal definitions applicable to R.S. 2477 would foster
uniform application and drastically reduce conflicts in some states, like
Utah, 138 which do not have a clear approach for resolving R.S. 2477 con-flicts. 139
In sum, Congress should enact a comprehensive federal policy for
determining the validity of purported R.S. 2477 rights-of-way. A legisla-
tive solution would provide much-needed clarity, uniformity, and finality
to the R.S. 2477 debate, effectively curbing the mounting costs of litiga-
tion for the state, local, and federal government.
C. Next Steps
While Wilderness Society provides a more straightforward rule that
removes several uncertainties surrounding R.S. 2477 disputes, it also
demonstrates the limitations of the judicial branch to devise a permanent,
national R.S. 2477 solution.14° Similarly, the Congressional moratorium
on formal R.S. 2477 rulemaking has rendered federal agencies powerless
to promote a national solution. Therefore, the resolution of this contro-
versy must come in the form of long-overdue Congressional legislation.
However, with its history of failed attempts, Congress may be reticent to
promote comprehensive R.S. 2477 legislation.
Even so, the proposed approach, which assigns succinct definitions
to R.S. 2477 terminology and places a time limit on filing claims, is more
135. R.S. 2477 REPORT, supra note 9, at 39.
136. 59 Fed. Reg. 39,218.
137. Matthew L. Squires, Note, Federal Regulation of R.S. 2477 Rights-of-Way, 63 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 547, 596-97 (2008) (quoting Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S.
389, 405 (1917); Canfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 526 (1897)).
138. "Utah state law . . . has established very broad criteria for the acceptance of a public
highway. No formal acceptance of a highway is necessary, public use is accepted, and no specific
road standards are necessary to establish a highway." R.S. 2477 REPORT, supra note 9, at 3 1.
139. CRS REPORT, supra note 22, at 45.
140. See Birdsong, supra note 17, at 546, 553 (arguing that the "courts have proven to be an
ineffective institution" for resolving R.S. 2477 disputes because of a "series of arguably inconsistent
rulings that contribute to, rather than resolve, legal uncertainty").
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attainable now than ever. While historically this has been unrealistic, 41
the Democratic Party's current control of both the legislative and execu-
tive branches of the United States government presents a realistic oppor-
tunity for meaningful change.
Growing evidence in the local media suggests that state and local
governments, as well as their citizens, are growing weary of R.S. 2477
litigation. 14 While counties continue to file and prosecute R.S. 2477
claims, the fact remains that an R.S. 2477 right-of-way claim can take
years to resolve, all at the expense of the taxpayer. Yet Wilderness Soci-
ety opened the door for environmental groups and other interested parties
to litigate questionable county management of purported R.S. 2477
routes, increasing the probability of future litigation. Citing a recent in-
terview with the president of the Kane County Taxpayer's Association,
the Salt Lake Tribune referenced Kane County's mounting legal bills:
"Kane County has not succeeded in claiming even one RS 2477 road,
and yet taxpayers have had to foot the bill for what appears to be $1 mil-
lion in expenses related to this failed attempt to own roads on public
land." 143 In the interview, the president of the taxpayer's association also
noted that the property taxes for Kane County residents have doubled in
recent years due to the mounting costs of litigation. 44 Such a burden may
convince advocates of a state law approach to consider the permanent,
environmentally-friendly solution that they have rejected so often in the
past.
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Wilderness Society shifted the
enormous controversy inherent in the R.S. 2477 debate. The decision
marked a success for environmental groups who established standing and
the proposition that a County could not use an R.S. 2477 right-of-way as
a defense to preemption claims without first establishing its rights in
court. Wilderness Society signals a more restrictive approach to R.S.
2477 jurisprudence in the Tenth Circuit, which could have broader im-
plications nationally. Still, courts have difficulty resolving R.S. 2477
conflicts largely because of the inherent ambiguity of the statute, which
has caused an insurmountable lack of consensus among courts, lawmak-
ers, and constituents.
141. Tova Wolking, Note, From Blazing Trails to Building Highways: SUWA v. BLM &
Ancient Easements over Federal Public Lands, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1067, 1105 (2007) ("[A] strict
federal standard that imposes a time limitation paired with an evidentiary burden borne solely by
states will be strongly opposed by Utah and other states that could stand to lose thousands of miles
of access routes.").
142. See, e.g., Mark Havnes, Kane and BLM to Take a Road Much Traveled Today, SALT
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To date, the federal approach to R.S. 2477 rights-of-way has been
unclear. The law is effectively at an impasse, with courts devising fact-
specific solutions to each conflict that arises. Going forward, Congress
must address the R.S. 2477 issue in a manner that defines the key terms
of the statute, provides an efficient manner for state and local govern-
ments to file claims, and, crucially, imposes a time limit for the filing of
R.S. 2477 claims. A comprehensive solution is not only essential for
judicial and economic efficiency, but also to ensure that the future of
public lands is secure and protected from further development.
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